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The Effect of Brexit on Workers’ Rights 
 





This article is being written against a background of great legal uncertainty and 
political volatility. We have just learned from the Prime Minister, Theresa May, that 
the UK Government will invoke Article 50 of the Treaty of European Union (TEU) 
before March 2017 and will introduce a Bill in the next Queen’s speech - the ‘Great 
Repeal Bill’ (GRB) - repealing the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) with effect 
from the date on which Brexit occurs.1 While the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
(ECJ) will end, according to Mrs May the existing aquis of EU law will be converted 
into UK law - though it is unclear precisely which provisions are embraced within 
that term - to be repealed, revoked or amended at leisure in later years. Turning her 
back on years of Conservative hostility to EU-guaranteed employment rights, the 
Prime Minister emphasised that ‘existing workers’ legal rights will continue to be 
guaranteed in law’ so long as she held that office. For good measure she added that 
as a result of the review announced the day before, to be conducted by Matthew 
Taylor, these rights would be ‘enhanced’ by the Conservative Party, now magically 
transformed into ‘the true workers’ party’.2   
 
As I write, no draft GRB has yet been published, there is little outline of the 
envisaged trading agreement with the EU, details of the Government’s proposals are 
scant and opaque, and litigation has commenced on the process for triggering Article 
50. As a result this article contains a good deal of speculation. What we do know, as I 
explained in detail in an advice written for the TUC prior to the referendum,3 is that 
most employment rights in the UK are at present guaranteed by EU law. The rights 
include protection against discrimination in the work sphere; the principal health 
and safety regulations; rights to collective information and consultation on 
redundancies, transfers and beyond; working time rights; protections of workers on 
transfers of undertakings and in insolvency; rules on the treatment of fixed-term, 
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1 Transcript available at <www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-
conference-speech-article-50-brexit-eu-a7341926.html> accessed 2 October 2016. 
2 Ibid. For outline of the review, see the article by M. Taylor in The Guardian, 1 October 2016, 
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/01/i-tell-theresa-may-working-lives-review-
modern-employment-zero-hours-flexibility > accessed 5 October 2016. 
3 M.Ford, Workers’ Rights from Europe: The Impact of Brexit (March 2016), available at 
<www.tuc.org.uk/international-issues/europe/eu-referendum/workplace-issues/brexit-could-risk-
%E2%80%9Clegal-and-commercial> accessed 26 September 2016. 
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agency and part-time workers; and other, more peripheral, rights such as data 
protection. The principal purely domestic exceptions are the individual rights not to 
be unfairly dismissed, to the national minimum wage and to redundancy payments, 
and the labyrinthine procedure for compulsory trade union recognition. 
 
During the debates about Brexit prior to the referendum, the main parties’ views on 
workers’ rights divided along traditional lines. For the Labour party, Jeremy Corbyn 
warned of a ‘bonfire of rights’ if the UK left the EU.4 This view was justified because 
the most prominent voices within the Conservative party were those of ‘leavers’, 
such as Boris Johnson, Michael Gove and Priti Patel, who saw ditching EU 
regulations, including employment regulations, as one of the major benefits of 
Brexit.5 While she was Minister for Employment, for example, Priti Patel went so far 
as to call for the UK to ‘halve the burdens of EU social and employment legislation’ 
after Brexit.6 These leavers drew on dubious evidence that, for example, the 
combined cost of the Working Time Directive and the Temporary Agency Work 
Directive was £6.3 billion each year.7 
 
This binary political world is now dissolving after the referendum, as the 
Conservatives attempt to reposition themselves in light of the social fractures 
exposed by the vote. The first sign of the shift was a statement from, David Davis, 
the newly appointed Secretary of State for Exiting the EU and a prominent ‘leaver’, 
that employment regulations should not be repealed post-Brexit, making the 
aberrant claim (for a Conservative politician) that ‘the empirical studies show that it 
is not employment regulation that stultifies economic growth, but all the other 
market-related regulations’.8 Later he told the Foreign Affairs Committee this was 
only his personal view9 and the Government Minister for Business, Energy and 
                                                 
4 Reported in e.g. The Guardian, 14 April 2016 (at 
<www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/14/jeremy-corbyn-leaving-eu-would-lead-to-bonfire-of-
rights> accessed 2 October 2016. 
5 See e.g. the article in the The Guardian, 11 May 2016  
<www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/11/boris-johnson-launches-the-vote-leave-battlebus-in-
cornwall> accessed 6 October 2016 
6 Speech to the Institute of Directors reported in e.g. The Belfast Telegraph, 18 May 2016 
<www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/news/brexit-would-boost-uk-economy-by-43bn-claims-
patel-34723908.html> accessed 15 September 2016. 
7 See e.g. Open Europe, Top 100 EU Rules Cost Britain £33.3 bn. The data were based on 
government impact assessments and are wholly unreliable as to the actual ‘costs’, even if these are 
defined as costs to business alone. <openeurope.org.uk/intelligence/britain-and-the-eu/top-100-eu-
rules-cost-britain-33-3bn> accessed 15 September 2016.  
8 D. Davis, ‘Trade Deals. Tax Cuts. And Taking Time Before Triggering Article 50. A Brexit 
Economic Strategy for Britain’, 14 July 2016 <www.conservativehome.com/platform/2016/07/david-
davis-trade-deals-tax-cuts-and-taking-time-before-triggering-article-50-a-brexit-economic-strategy-
for-britain.html> accessed 30 August 2016. 
9 Foreign Affairs Committee, Oral Evidence, 13 September 2016, questions 191-3; available at 
<data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-
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Industrial Strategy, Margot James, declined to give any assurance in Parliament that 
current employment rights would be preserved post-Brexit.10 But this was only a 
temporary restoration of normal affairs. Trade unions, the TUC and others, such as 
Melanie Onn, the Labour MP who sponsored a Private Members’ Bill on the 
subject,11 ensured that the issue did not disappear from the public gaze, and may 
have influenced the Prime Minister in deciding to adopt Mr Davis’ position as 
official policy. It was probably inevitable in any case that any repeal of workers’ 
rights would need to be deferred until after Brexit, if only in the interests of legal 
certainty.12 Mrs May made a virtue out of this necessity, the latest instalment in the 
history of a party in which pragmatism or opportunism has often triumphed over 
ideology.13  
 
So we are entering uncharted political waters, another unexpected consequence of 
the peculiar post-referendum world. A Conservative party which has spent years 
resisting diktats from Brussels on employment law in accordance with a neo-liberal 
ideology of unregulated labour markets now apparently endorses the very same 
rights.14 Any unfinished business with workers’ rights has been pushed back to the 
distant horizon of the post-Brexit and perhaps post-May world, where the 
discounted value of Ms May’s personal assurance is anyone’s guess. 
 
There is a further factor, however, which I suspect is relevant to why the Prime 
Minister felt untroubled in giving her personal assurance and why it has so far not 
generated objections from within the Conservative party or from business: the means 
adopted in the UK to give effect to those rights. As a result of recent reforms, the 
practical impact of the legal rights guaranteed to workers by EU law (as well as by 
domestic law) has very significantly diminished. Two recent reforms in particular 
stand out, because they both centrally affected EU-derived rights conferred on 
workers.  
                                                                                                                                                        
committee/implications-of-leaving-the-eu-for-the-uks-role-in-the-world/oral/38141.html> accessed 
14 September 2016. 
10 House of Commons, Hansard 13 September 2016, available at 
<hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-09-13/debates/16091315000021/TopicalQuestions> 
accessed 15 September 2016. 
11 The Workers’ Rights (Maintenance of EU Standards) Bill, available at  
<services.parliament.uk/bills/2016-17/workersrightsmaintenanceofeustandards.html >accessed 15 
September 2016. 
12 This is because if the ECA were simply repealed without such a saving provision, all 
secondary legislation made under it would be revoked by implication ( Watson v Winch [1916] 1 KB 
688), generating enormous uncertainty about transitional effects: see ss.16 and 23 of the Interpretation 
Act 1978 and Ford (n 3) at paras 83-84. 
13 A. Seddon, ‘The Conservative Century’ in A. Seddon and S. Balls (eds) The Conservative 
Century (Oxford UP, 1994). 
14 For a fuller account of the history, see M. Ford ‘The Impact of Brexit on UK Labour Law’ 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (forthcoming). 
  4 
 
The first relates to the means of enforcing health and safety regulations at work. 
Following legislation introduced by the previous Government in 2013, these are now 
the subject of only criminal sanctions.15 In a stroke, a rule that had stood for over 150 
years - that a worker injured as a result of a breach of health and safety legislation 
could bring a civil claim for damages16 - was swept aside. The ostensible reason for 
this change, according to the coalition Government, was in order to address the 
unfairness of strict liability, that an employer could be liable for damages in civil 
proceedings even though it had taken all reasonable steps to prevent the injury.17 But 
the reform was not restricted to excluding civil liability for breach of those (very few) 
regulations which impose strict liability.18 Instead it embraced all health and safety 
regulations, including the many provisions which are qualified by standards such as 
reasonable practicability.19 The blanket rule, according to the Government, was 
applied because it was less complex to enact, and would be easier for employers to 
understand, so addressing perceptions of a ‘compensation culture’.20  
 
These thin justifications give rise to the legitimate suspicion of a Government 
removing civil liability in order simply to reduce the perceived or actual cost of all 
health and safety regulations.21 The principal regulations governing workplace 
health and safety are now derived from EU law,22 so that the standards in the 
regulations themselves could not easily be watered down. While the EU law 
principle of effectiveness requires some adequate means of enforcing breach of such 
regulations, the Government presumably concluded that a system of criminal 
enforcement alone would just about pass muster, reinforced in its view by the Court 
of Appeal judgment in a similar context in R (URTU) v Secretary of State for 
                                                 
15 See s.69 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, amending s.47 of the Health 
and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. 
16 See Couch v Steel (1852) 3 E & V 402 and the chapter by M. Loban, especially 1002-1012, in 
W. Cornish, S. Anderson, R. Cocks, M. Lobban, P. Polden and K. Smith, The Oxford History of the Laws 
of England, Volume X11, 1820-1914 (Oxford UP 2010) 
17 The Government Response to the Löfstedt Report (November 2011) 13-14 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/66794/lofstedt-report-
response.pdf> accessed 15 September 2016. 
18 An example is regulation 5 of the Provision and Use of Equipment Regulations 1998, SI 
1998/2306. 
19 Such as many of those giving effect to EU Directives: see e.g. the Manual Handling 
Regulations 1992, SI 1992/2793. 
20 BIS, Strict Liability in Health and Safety at Work Legislation (11 June 2012) at 8   
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/34655/12-1219-strict-
liability-health-safety-at-work-impact.pdf >accessed 15 September 2016.  
21 See Government Response (n 17), 15. 
22 In particular, the so-called ‘six pack’: see J. Clarke, Redgrave’s Health and Safety (LexisNexis 
2016). 
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Transport.23 After the changes, the common law of negligence remains as a 
supplement to the criminal law in addressing some failings in health and safety; but 
it is based on a different and lower standard, involving less specific duties, than the 
health and safety regulations. Exclusive criminal enforcement, conducted by a 
Health and Safety Executive with a reduced budget, can only worsen the remedies 
for injured workers and therefore reduce the cost to employers, as well as probably 
leading to a general lowering of safety standards. 
 
The second major reform was, of course, the introduction of fees for bringing claims 
in the employment tribunal (ET). In common with the default mechanism for 
enforcing workers’ rights with a purely domestic origin, almost all  EU-derived 
standards apart from health and safety are enforced exclusively by conferring an 
individual right of complaint to the ET. With effect from July 2013, unless an 
individual is entitled to ‘remission’ owing to her level of disposable capital and 
earnings, she must pay a fee before bringing a claim in an ET and a separate fee 
before a hearing.24 The fees are very significant for claimants, especially those on low 
incomes, those who have just lost their jobs or those who have not been paid their 
wages. The revised remission scheme25 has meant that far fewer individuals obtained 
remission than the Government predicted during the consultation which preceded 
fees;26 one reason may be that both notice pay and redundancy payments count 
towards the disposable capital limit of £3,000.27  
 
When one adds in the costs of taking a tribunal claim, the low level of compensation 
awarded by ETs, the lamentable record of tribunal awards that are never paid (which 
will mean successful claimants will also not recover their fees), and the difficulties of 
assessing prospects of success in areas such as discrimination, a powerful deterrent 
effect on claimants was to be expected.28 Indeed, there is a good argument that an 
                                                 
23 [2013] IRLR 890 - a case concerning the criminal sanctions for breach of the Road Transport 
(Working Time) Regulations 2005, implementing Directive 3002/15/EC. 
24 See the Employment Tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013, SI 
2013/1893. 
25 Now set out in a new Schedule 3 to the Fees Order. 
26 In 2014/15, after fees were introduced, about 20% of claimants obtained remission: see 
Ministry of Justice, Tribunal and Gender Recognition Statistics Quarterly: April to June 2016, table ETF.1 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/550952/tribunal-and-
gpc-stats.pdf> accessed 16 September 2016. Contrast the Government’s much higher assessment in the 
Impact Assessment on fees, based on the pre-fees population of claimants: see Introducing a Fee 
Charging Regime in the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal: Impact Assessment (30 
May 2012), 25-28 <consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/et-fee-charging-regime-cp22-
2011/results/et-fees-response-ia.pdf> accessed 16 September 2016. 
27 Fees Order, ibid, Schedule 3 para 10. 
28 For the latest median awards, see table E.4 in the statistics at n 26. For the evidence on 
enforcement, see BIS, Payment of Tribunal Awards: 2013 Study (IFF Research); 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253558/bis-13-1270-
enforcement-of-tribunal-awards.pdf>accessed 16 September 2016. 
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economically rational hypothetical claimant would almost never bring a claim.29 In 
the event, actual claimants responded as predicted, contradicting the absurd 
assumption of the Ministry of Justice that ‘ET claimants would not be highly price 
sensitive to fee-charging’.30 Fees led to an immediate precipitous decline in the 
number of tribunal claims, which has been maintained consistently since, with single 
claims (which are more statistically reliable than the fluctuating ‘multiple’ claims) 
declining by about 67 per cent.31 But so far a judicial review challenge brought by the 
trade union UNISON, based principally on the EU principle of effectiveness and EU 
anti-discrimination law, has proven to be unsuccessful, though it is due to be heard 
by the Supreme Court at the end of March 2017.32  
 
While the previous Government tiptoed carefully around EU law in enacting these 
twin reforms, they are illustrative of an emerging trend of using changes to 
procedures, qualifying conditions or remedies greatly to weaken the effect of 
substantive rights both in employment33 and in other areas.34 They make the case for 
erasing existing worker rights from the statute book less pressing, even for a future 
Government with deregulation high on its agenda. No doubt the reforms assisted the 
Prime Minister in appeasing the many in the Conservative party who favour a 
highly deregulated labour market when she gave her assurance to the conference: 
rights may be ‘guaranteed’ post-Brexit in the statute book, but not in practice. A 
Janus-faced Conservative administration can announce that employment rights will 
be ‘enhanced’ as a result of the fresh review to be conducted by Matthew Taylor 
(which will examine how non-standard forms of employment undermine legal 
standards such as the minimum wage), yet at the same time fail to publish the long-
awaited review which ought to address one of the major underlying causes, namely 
                                                 
29 A. Adams and J. Prassl ‘Vexatious Claims: Challenging the Case for Employment Tribunal 
Fees’ Modern Law Review (forthcoming). 
30 Introducing a Fee Charging Regime in the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal: Impact Assessment (30 May 2012) para 4.12 <consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-
communications/et-fee-charging-regime-cp22-2011/results/et-fees-response-ia.pdf> accessed 6 
October 2016. 
31 See the excellent analysis by D.Pyper and F.McGuinness in the House of Commons Briefing 
Paper, Employment Tribunal Fees (No. 7081, June 2016), 11; 
<researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN07081/SN07081.pdf > (accessed 16 September 
2016) and the report of the House of Commons Justice Committee, Courts and Tribunal Fees: Second 
Report of Session 2016-17 <www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/justice-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/courts-and-tribunals-fees-and-
charges/publications/> accessed 16 September 2016. 
32 R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2016] ICR 1, CA. 
33 For example, the recent increase in the qualifying period and the 12-month cap on damages 
for unfair dismissal (see now s.108(1) and s.124(ZA) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA)), or the 
two-year long stop on claims for deduction from wages in s.23(4A) ERA. 
34 See e.g. the recent proposal for a five-fold increase in fees for claims in the Immigration and 
Asylum Tribunal. 
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the current fees system.35 
 
Now that the long-term fate of the substantive rights has receded into the distance, 
probably assisted by the twin reforms I have identified, in this article I want to focus 
on two, narrower issues about Brexit. The first is the potential short-term 
consequences of Brexit for workers’ rights, once the UK is no longer a Member State 
of the EU and the GRB is introduced as an Act. In this area, there is a reasonable 
amount of legal material to draw upon, though many contingencies remain. The 
second, less immediate, effect is the extent to which Brexit will increase the power of 
the UK government to maintain or intensify collateral attacks on employment rights 
which the recent reforms to health and safety and tribunal procedure exemplify. For 
I suspect this strategy, having now been widely tested and seen to ‘work’, will be the 
method of choice in the future even if it may be on hold in the medium-term. 
 
II. POTENTIAL EARLY EFFECTS OF BREXIT 
At present many significant effects of EU law, on workers’ rights and beyond, flow 
from the Treaties themselves, and are imposed on ‘Member States’. These obligations 
include, for instance, the principle of ‘sincere co-operation’ in, now, Article 4(3) TEU 
by which ‘Member States shall take any appropriate measures, general or particular, 
to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties’. The consequence of 
the UK ceasing to be a ‘Member State’ is that these and similar Treaty obligations 
would no longer apply to it, regardless of the introduction of the GRB. These issues 
are far from legally straightforward, much ink will be spilt on them in the run up to 
Brexit taking effect, and much depends on the precise wording of the GRB. But 
below I highlight some of the probable and possible early casualties of Brexit. 
 
(i) Loss of References to ECJ 
The jurisdiction of the ECJ to give preliminary rulings on EU law is restricted to 
references from a ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’,36 so the power of domestic 
courts to make references will fall away once the UK leaves the EU. The GRB will 
apparently confirm this inevitable legal result of Brexit itself.  In the meantime, the 
UK courts may well be less enthusiastic to make references, even if strictly the duty 
to adhere to EU law will be unaffected until the UK formally withdraws from the 
Treaties.  
 
It can no longer be assumed (if it ever could) that the ECJ will invariably adopt the 
starting point that social Directives only exist to protect workers, as exemplified by 
the recognition of business interests in the recent judgments in Alemo-Herron37 and 
                                                 
35 Fees, after all, especially affect low value claims, such as unpaid wages: see Courts and 
Tribunal Fees (n 31), 27-29 (see too the criticisms on the delay in publishing the review, 23-4). 
36 Article 267 TEU.  
37 Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure [2013] ICR 116. 
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USDAW v Ethel Austin.38 But still its general tendency is still to give social rights a 
wide meaning because they are of particular importance,39 to interpret derogations 
from then strictly,40 and to pay much greater attention to international treaties on 
labour law than the domestic courts.41 
 
Once domestic courts replace the ECJ as the arbiters of what a social Directive 
means, I think the overwhelming likelihood is of a worsening of the position of 
workers. Though the UK courts have had many years to become acquainted with EU 
social law, they are not easily deflected from a tradition of giving priority to property 
rights and freedom of contract or from their focus on the literal meaning of 
legislation.42 As a crude summary: without the assistance of guidance from the ECJ, 
the UK appellate courts have hardly ever given a social Directive a wide 
interpretation in favour of workers.43 Conversely, as I have pointed out elsewhere, 
there are many examples of the domestic courts confidently deciding that provisions 
of employment Directives had a narrow reach, only to be effectively reversed by the 
ECJ.44 Working time cases provide a perfect example: without the references to the 
ECJ, sometimes made reluctantly or only at the highest appellate stage, the result of 
litigation affecting thousands of workers would have been very different.45 Writing 
as a practitioner, I have little doubt that employers’ lawyers on the whole would 
much prefer to keep matters cosy within the domestic courts rather than risk a trip to 
Luxembourg - perhaps as good a guide as any in an area of such broad sweep. In the 
                                                 
38 Case C-80/14 [2015] ICR 675. 
39 See Ford n 3 paras 12-13 and e.g. Case C-520/06, Stringer [2009] ICR 1149, para 22 (working 
time), Case C-307/05, Del Cerro Alonso [2008] ICR 145, paras 27, 38 (fixed-term workers) and Case C-
83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie [2015] IRLR 746, para 42 (discrimination). 
40 See, among many other cases, Del Cerro Alonso, ibid, para 39. 
41 See e.g. the reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 
Case C-335/11, Ring [2013] ICR 851. 
42 Though cf. how the highest courts used the existence of statutory rights, uniquely, to deny 
dismissed workers the ordinary  remedies for a breach of contract Johnson v Unisys [2003] AC 1, 
Edwards v Chesterfield [2012] 2 AC 22. 
43 For a recent example, see the EAT in Santos Gomes v Higher Level Care [2016] IRLR 678, 
holding that claims for denials of rest breaks under the Working Time Regulations were ‘analogous’ 
to breach of contract claims (para 69), with the consequence that damages were rarely payable. Cf. 
Nolan v USA [2016] AC 463, holding that the provisions of TULRCA on collective redundancies could 
go further than the parent Directive. 
44 See Ford (n 3), para 12. 
45 See, for example, Marshalls Clay v Caulfield [2004] ICR 1502, (CA took view rolled-up 
holiday pay did not infringe Directive and not keen to refer), reversed by Case C-131/04 and C-
257/04, Robinson-Steele [2006] ICR 932, ECJ; Stringer [2005] ICR 1149, CA (workers on sick leave not 
entitled to annual leave, reference only made by House of Lords), reversed by Case C-520-06, Stringer 
[2009] ECR I-179, ECJ; Bamsey [2004] ICR 1183, CA and Williams [2009] ICR 906 (CA concluded no 
prescribed level of pay for annual leave under Article 7, and made no reference to ECJ); reversed by 
the ECJ in Case C-155/10, Williams v British Airways [2012] ICR 847, following reference from the 
Supreme Court. 
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absence of an existing ECJ ruling directly on the point, the risk is that the domestic 
appellate courts return to their default position, emboldened by knowing that they 
can no longer be ticked off by the ECJ.  
 
(ii) The interpretative obligation? 
The interpretative obligation, by which domestic regulations must be interpreted so 
far as is possible to achieve the result required by EU law, is at root an obligation 
imposed by the Treaties on domestic courts qua authorities of a Member State.46  It is 
not clear if this will be preserved in the GRB but at present this looks doubtful 
because it would be an indirect means of effectively undermining the Prime 
Minister’s claim that ‘judges interpreting [EU] laws will sit not in Luxembourg but in 
the courts in this country’.47 For if post-Brexit UK judges continue to owe a duty to 
interpret domestic law so far as is possible in line with ECJ jurisprudence, in 
practical terms the ECJ will remain supreme. In the absence of an express 
preservation of the Marleasing duty or something similar in the GRB, the duty would 
disappear with the UK leaving the EU. 
 
This, too, could generate detrimental effects for workers’ rights. For if the domestic 
courts have experienced difficulties in interpreting EU Directives, they have been 
very vigorous in bringing domestic law into line once the ECJ has instructed them on 
the correct interpretation of EU law means, illustrated long ago in Pickstone v 
Freemans48 and culminating with the current ‘broad and far reaching’ interpretative 
obligation summarised in Vodafone 249 which has now been endorsed by the Supreme 
Court.50 In this they appear to have gone further than other Member States, as shown 
by how UK courts have dealt with the contra legem.51 There are many examples in the 
work sphere of how this obligation operated in favour of workers, such in equal pay 
(where domestic law is deeply entangled with EU law52), discrimination and 
working time.53 
 
In the absence of an express legislative ‘freezing’ of the Marleasing obligation, once 
the UK has withdrawn from the EU the way is open for arguments that previous 
                                                 
46 See e.g. Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, para 8, and the Grand Chamber in 
Case C-397-403/01, Pfeiffer, at paras 110-114, referring among others to former Article 10, now Article 
4(3) TEU. 
47 Theresa May’s speech to Conservative party conference, n 1. 
48 [1989] AC 66. 
49 Vodafone 2 v Revenue and Customs [2010] Ch 77 per Sir Andrew Morritt VC, paras 37-38. 
50 Robertson v Swift [2014] 1 WLR 3428, paras 20-21. 
51 See Lock v British Gas [2016] EWCA Civ 803 per Sir Colin Rimer at paras 102-103; contrast 
e.g. the approach of the Danish Court discussed in Case C-441/14, Dansk v Rasmussen [2016] IRLR 552, 
discussed in Lock. 
52 For a useful summary, see Mummery LJ in Redcar and Cleveland BC v Bainbridge [2009] ICR 
133, paras 30-60. 
53 See my advice for the TUC (n 3), para18 for some examples. 
  10 
decisions of the domestic courts, based on that obligation, should no longer be 
binding in their application to post-Brexit events. There will remain a counter-
argument of purely domestic interpretation, that Parliament ‘intended’ to give effect 
to the relevant provisions of EU law. But this approach is mostly restricted to 
implementing legislation and is much less aggressive than the interpretative 
obligation. It would not permit, for example, significant departures from the literal 
wording, let alone the rewriting of domestic provisions. The recent ruling in Lock v 
British Gas, reinterpreting the Working Time Regulations 1998 to ensure commission 
was included in holiday pay in accordance with the parent Directive, is a good 
example: the Court of Appeal was explicit that domestic techniques alone could not 
achieve that result.54 The result will be a messy period post-Brexit, when many 
points established in favour of workers after long battles through the appeal system 
will be vulnerable to being challenged anew.  
 
(iii) Direct Effect? 
The doctrine of direct effect gives vertical effect to sufficiently precise provisions of 
Directives, and horizontal effect to some Articles of the TFEU, such as Article 157 on 
equal pay, and to general principles of EU law, such as the right not to be 
discriminated against.55 It too is derived from the obligation of a Member State under 
the Treaties, independent of domestic law, so that Brexit should put an end to it 
independent of domestic legislation.56 It is not clear if this doctrine will be preserved 
as part of the acquis which Mrs May said would be preserved in the GRB. On the one 
hand, its preservation would tend to undermine her notion that post-Brexit the UK 
would be a ‘fully independent, sovereign country’,57 especially if the legislation 
preserved the direct effect of (some?) Treaty articles or the EU Charter. On the other, 
it may be necessary to preserve at least EU regulations which have direct effect by 
virtue of Article 288 TFEU (though these are of limited relevance to employment 
law). Once more, the drafters of the GRB will have some difficult legal rocks to 
navigate around.  
 
Assuming the doctrine disappears on Brexit and is not retained in the GRB (at least 
in relation to Directives or Articles of the Treaties), its loss would operate 
ambiguously for workers. Owing to the expansive approach the courts have taken to 
the interpretative obligation, it has had less territory to occupy. Still, in areas such as 
equal pay and working time it has often circumvented any problems of 
interpretation and ensured workers were granted a remedy,58 and it will become 
                                                 
54 Lock n 51 per Sir Colin Rimer at para 49. 
55 See most recently Case C-441/14, Dansk v Rasmussen [2016] IRLR 552, paras 21-27. 
56 The same should apply to the linked obligation on a Member State to pay compensation for 
its failure to implement EU law, following. 
57 Theresa May, speech at n 1. 
58 In equal pay cases, for example, it is common to plead Article 157 in the alternative, to 
ensure no issues of interpretation arise. For an application in working time, where the court was able 
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more important if the interpretative obligation withers in time.  
 
On the other hand, direct effect of economic freedoms in the Treaties, such as 
freedom of establishment in, now, Article 49 TFEU and freedom to provide services 
in Article 56 TFEU have been the source of powerful curbs on collective action. 
Foremost among the ECJ decisions is Viking, where the Court held that Article 49 
had horizontal direct effect, so enabling a private company to obtain an injunction 
and unlimited damages against a striking union.59 In the same vein, in Laval Article 
56 precluded strike action aimed at ensuring posted workers received collectively-
bargained rates of pay.60 While domestic law places a bewildering array of 
procedural and substantive restrictions on strikes, which will be significantly 
increased once the Trade Union Act 2016 comes into force, it does not independently 
incorporate the provisions of the Treaties, and it still retains a cap on damages.61 In 
an environment where the legal costs alone for interim injunctions often run into 
hundreds of thousands of pounds, the threat of potentially unlimited damages on 
top has had serious ‘chilling’ effect on some industrial action, as Tonia Novitz and 
Phil Syrpis have noted.62 
 
(iv) Francovich and Infringement Proceedings? 
Direct effect is one means for closing the gap which opens up where domestic law 
cannot be interpreted in accordance with EU law, which can only expand if the 
Marleasing duty weakens. The other EU mechanisms for penalising a Member State 
whose laws do not correspond with EU law will also disappear with Brexit. It will 
put paid to the Francovich action for damages against the UK where it has failed 
properly to implement EU law, because that duty is equally a creature of Article 4(3) 
of the TEU, and it is pretty much unimaginable that the UK would give effect to this 
duty via the GRB.63 Infringement proceedings by the Commission under Article 258 
TFEU will also cease, and the Commission will probably discontinue any existing 
infringement proceedings against the UK, given that the UK Government could 
simply ignore any judgment of the ECJ against it. Infringement actions in the past 
had a significant role in ensuring UK employment law was brought into line with EU 
Directives,64 and they remain a useful means of a complaint about non-compliance 
                                                                                                                                                        
to interpret the domestic legislation as well, see NHS Leeds v Larner [2012] ICR 1389. 
59 Case C-438/05 ITWF v Viking Line ABP [2007] ECR I-1077, and see P.Sypris and T.Novitz, 
‘Economic and Social Rights in Conflict: Political and Judicial Approaches to their Reconciliation’ 
(2008) 33(3) European Law Review 411. 
60 Case C-341/05 [2008] IRLR 160. 
61 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, s.22. 
62 T. Novitz and P. Syrpis ‘The United Kingdom’ in M. Freeland and J. Prassl (eds), Viking, 
Laval and Beyond (Hart 2014) 
63 Case C-6 and 9/90 Francovich [1995] ICR 722. 
64 See e.g. Commission v UK [1994] ICR 578 (equal value claims) and Commission v UK [1994] 
ICR 664 (consultation where no recognised unions). 
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outside of individual litigation, especially for bodies such as NGOs.65   
 
III. FUTURE EU SOCIAL LAW 
The most obvious certain casualty of Brexit will be future social rights adopted by 
the EU after the UK has withdrawn from the Treaties: not even Ms May’s guarantee 
is likely to have dynamic effect and embrace EU law as enacted from time to time. 
Here too the long-term trajectory of the EU is not easy to predict, as social Europe 
has waxed and waned over the years. Little social law has been introduced since the 
Lisbon strategy was agreed in 2000,66 and following the financial crisis EU policies in 
the name of austerity and competitiveness have increasingly driven deregulation of 
labour protections at national level, with sectoral collective bargaining a particular 
target.67  
 
In this context it is unsurprising that the current agenda for additional social rights 
by means of ‘hard’ law is restrained.  The Commission’s current work programme is 
aimed at modernising and recasting existing law rather than introducing significant 
new Directives.68 There is a consultation on introducing legislation to improve 
flexible work arrangements for parents and carers.69 The proposal to amend the 
Posted Workers Directive (predictably resisted by the former Eastern bloc countries), 
to ensure posted workers receive not just the legal minimum wage but also rates of 
pay in ‘collective agreements which have been declared universally applicable’, 
marks a step towards cutting the particular legal Gordian knot in this area. But it is 
not relevant to the UK system of collective bargaining.70 The Commission’s proposal 
for a ‘European Pillar of Social Rights’ envisages, among other matters, new 
minimum standards on fair remuneration and adequate compensation for dismissal 
of workers.71 The modesty of this initiative has been criticised by Bogg and Ewing,72 
                                                 
65 The TUC, for example, recently complained to the Commission about the UK’s 
implementation of the Temporary Agency Work Directive - see <www.tuc.org.uk/workplace-
issues/employment-rights/proposed-changes-law/basic-rights-work/tuc-lodges-complaint> 
accessed 5 October 2016. 
66 C. Barnard, EU Employment Law, chapter 3 (Oxford University Press, 2012) 
67 See e.g. K. Ewing, ‘The Death of Social Europe’ (2015) 26 King’s Law Journal 76 
68  See the Commission Work Programme 2016 COM(2015) 610 final at 
<ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2016_en.pdf> (accessed 24 August 2016) and the List of Planned 
Commission Initiatives (2016) at 
<ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/planned_commission_initiatives_2016.pdf> accessed 5 October  2016.  
69 Commission Consultation Document C(2016) 2472 final (12 July 2016) 
<ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/economic-independence/economic-growth/index_en.htm> 
accessed 5 October 2016. 
70 Commission Proposal COM(2016)128 final < ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=471> 
accessed 5 October 2016. 
71 See the Commission, Launching a Consultation on a European Pillar of Social Rights COM(2016) 
127 final, at para. 3 (available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1457706909489&uri=COM:2016:127:FIN; accessed 5 October 2016). For 
discussion, see K. Lörcher and I.Schömann, The European Pillar of Social Rights: Critical Legal Analysis 
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but even if enacted it would not apply to the UK by virtue of its membership of the 
EU because it ‘will be developed within the euro area, while allowing other EU 
Member States to join in if they want to do so’.73 We await to see if these last two 
proposals are enacted, are the beginnings of a shift towards a revitalised social 
agenda or the embers of a dying one, or are joined by others by the time of Brexit. 
 
4. EU LAW RESTRICTING COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON RIGHTS 
The last issue I wish to explore is the extent to which Brexit will open up more space 
for pursing the current fashion for collateral attacks on substantive worker rights. EU 
law has developed a range of principles controlling the means by which Member 
States give proper effect to EU law. At an early stage the ECJ in Rewe interpreted the 
duty of cooperation in, now, Article 4 TEU as entailing that national procedural rules 
must not render it impossible in practice to exercise EU rights, and nor must they be 
less favourable than the rules protecting similar claims under national law.74 The ECJ 
has evolved the law considerably since, relaxing the principle of effectiveness to a 
standard that procedures must not make it ‘excessively difficult’ to exercise EU 
rights, and developing a general obligation on Member States to ensure the effective 
judicial protection of EU rights.75 Drawing on the Treaties,76 in Von Colson the ECJ 
ruled that sanctions must ‘guarantee real and effective judicial protection’, so that 
where civil compensation is the means chosen by a Member State for protecting EU 
rights it must fully cover the loss and damage sustained and have a real deterrent 
effect.77 This led, of course, to removal of the caps which at the time were features of 
UK anti-discrimination law.78  
 
These principles are now reinforced by additional provisions: Article 19 of the TEU 
requires Member States to provide ‘remedies sufficient to ensure judicial protection’ 
in the areas covered by EU law; Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU gives ‘everyone the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal’ if their EU-
guaranteed rights are infringed; and some Directives, such as those in 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Proposals (European Trade Union Institute, 2016) 
72 A. Bogg and K.Ewing, ‘The Continuing Evolution of European Labour Law and the 
Changing Context for Trade Union Organising’ (2017) 38(2) Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 
(forthcoming). 
73 Consultation on a European Pillar of Social Rights , n 70, 7. 
74 Case C-33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989 at paras 5-6 
75 See especially Case C-432/05, Unibet [2007] ECR I-2771 at paras 37-42, Case C-C268/06, 
Impact [2008] ECR I-2438, paras 37-47 and S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the 
Relationship Between “Rewe-effectiveness” and Effective Judicial Protection’ (2011) 42 Review of 
European Administrative Law 31. 
76 In, now, respectively Article 4 TEU and Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
EU. 
77 Case C-14/83, Von Colson [1984] ECR 1891 paras 22-24 
78 See the original s.65 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s.56 Race Relations Act 1976 and s.2 of the 
Equal Pay Act 1970. 
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discrimination, now expressly articulate the Von Colson principle on remedies.79 EU 
law has also prevented the use of qualifying periods for workers’ rights or the 
attempt to carve out exemptions for small businesses, demonstrated by the ECJ 
ruling in BECTU.80 Finally, EU law supplements the duties on public bodies in s.29 
and s.149 of the Equality Act 2010 and challenges to potentially discriminatory 
domestic legislation via judicial review, including by equality bodies.81 
 
One consequence of these EU principles has been to limit recent government’s 
collateral attacks on workers’ rights. For example, when the last Government moved 
quickly to limit employers’ potential liability for holiday pay claims under the 
Working Time Regulations in the wake of the EAT judgment in Fulton v Bear 
Scotland,82 it had to ensure that the temporal limit applied to other types of claims for 
past wages, for fear of breaching the EU principle of equivalence.83 That the result 
was to penalise deserving claimants such as those who had not been paid the 
national minimum wage - just the sort of issue the forthcoming review is meant to 
address - was an unfortunate but necessary side effect of a policy designed to protect 
businesses. It is clear, too, that the last Government was committed to ‘reviewing’ 
uncapped damages for discrimination but was stopped in its tracks by the Von 
Colson principle, as the Government acknowledged at the time.84 EU law was 
probably influential, too, in the decision to drop the original ‘Option 2' to use  
tribunal fees to cap compensation awards, following objections in the consultation 
that this was incompatible with EU law.85  
 
We should not overlook the Limitations of EU law in this area, highlighted by the 
Court of Appeal judgments in UNISON and URTU.86 The outcome in UNISON leads 
                                                 
79 See e.g. Article 25 of Directive 2006/54 and the discussion of its history in the opinion of 
Advocate General Mengozzi in Case C-407/14, Arjona Camacho [2016] ICR 389. 
80 See the original regulation 13 to the Working Time Regulations 1998 and Case C-173/99, 
BECTU [2001] ECR I-4881, where the ECJ rejected an argument from the UK government that it could 
impose restrictions on holiday entitlement in the interests of small businesses (at paras 57-61). 
81 See e.g. R v Secretary of State for Employment ex parte EOC [1995] 1 AC 1 
82 [2015] ICR 221. 
83 See s.23(4A)-(4B) of ERA, introduced by SI 2014/332 
84 BIS, Employment Law Review: Annual Update (2012), 15-16, 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49015/12-p136-
employment-law-review-2012.pdf > accessed 16 September 2016. 
85 See Ministry of Justice, Charging Fees in the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal (14 December 2011) and, Charging Fees in the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal: Response to Consultation (13 July 2012), both at <consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-
communications/et-fee-charging-regime-cp22-2011> accessed 6 October 2016.  
86 See n 23 and n 32 respectively. Note too criticisms of the EU’s own failure to respect 
international legal obligations on collective bargaining and striking: K. Ewing and J. Hendy ‘The 
Eclipse of the Rule of Law: Trade Union Rights and the EU’ (2015) 4 Revista Derecho Social y Empresa 
80. 
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Bogg and Ewing to criticize ‘the failure of EU law to provide solutions to what is 
historically one of the most severe challenges to the Rule of Law in relation to 
workers’ rights’.87 A partial response is that both claims largely turned on the 
evidence before the courts leaving open the possibility that other evidence would 
lead to a different result. In URTU, for instance, there was a specific finding on the 
effectiveness of the enforcement regime,88 and in UNISON the Court of Appeal was 
clear that if the review of fees showed that claimants could not realistically afford to 
pay fees ‘the level of fees and/or the remission criteria will need to be revisited’.89 It 
remains to be seen if the Supreme Court in UNISON will take a different view of the 
evidence or conclude that the Court of Appeal adopted too narrow a review 
standard in deciding that the relevant criterion for the purpose of Article 6 ECHR 
and the EU principle of effectiveness was solely whether claimants could reasonably 
afford to pay a fee, as Adams and Prassl argue.90 
 
More fundamentally, the powerful criticism of Bogg and Ewing depends on how 
much you rely on EU law to ensure adherence to the UK’s own legal standards. The 
EU principles are, as always, only minimum standards because the ECJ has had to 
walk a tightrope between enforcing uniform EU-wide standards and preserving the 
procedural autonomy of Member States.91 Nothing prevents a Member State e.g. 
combining civil sanctions with criminal penalties, as used to be the case with health 
and safety regulations in the UK. Moreover, the requirements for effective individual 
and systemic enforcement of labour rights extend far beyond any simple model of 
top-down legal rules, since they turn upon factors such as knowledge of rights, 
access to legal advice, capacity to bring claims, the type of enforcement mechanism 
and so on, as a large literature attests.92 You can’t expect the high level norms of EU 
law to fill this gap: it needs state action on the ground and other forms of support 
mechanisms for workers. 
 
But in so far as the overarching legal norms are part of the solution, post-Brexit the 
EU principles will be replaced by the common law and, at least pending a UK Bill of 
Rights, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). These 
sources add nothing to EU law and in several respects provide significantly weaker 
protection. First, Article 47 of the EU Charter already guarantees at least the same 
level of protection as Article 6 ECHR, with the additional supplement that it cannot 
                                                 
87 See n 72. 
88 URTU para 33, citing the finding of Hickinbottom J. at para 84(vii) in the High Court. 
89 Underhill LJ, n 32, para 76. 
90 See n 29 and UNISON n 32 per Underhill LJ at para 41. 
91 For the history, see A. Dashwood, M. Dougan, B. Rodger, E. Spavenata and D. Wyatt, Wyatt 
and Dashwood’s European Law (Hart 2011), 289-302 
92 An issue on which Linda Dickens, in particular, has been vigilant. See e.g. L. Dickens (ed), 
Making Employment Rights Effective (Hart 2012). 
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be overridden by primary legislation.93 Second, there is no analogue in Article 6 
ECHR or the common law to the requirement of effective remedies derived from Von 
Colson, including uncapped civil compensation.94 Third, the principle of equivalence 
is unique to EU law. Fourth, EU law goes considerably further than Article 6 in the 
means it recognises as necessary to protect rights. In Coote, for instance, the ECJ held 
that anti-discrimination law would lose an ‘essential part of its effectiveness’ if it did 
not protect workers against post-employment victimisation, given the aim was ‘to 
arrive at real equality of opportunity’.95 Similarly, in Impact the Grand Chamber went 
so far as to indicate that the need to bring proceedings in the ordinary courts instead 
of specialist labour tribunals would infringe the principle of effective judicial 
protection if it resulted in procedural disadvantages, such as costs, which made it 
excessively difficult to bring the claims.96 The same principle also prevented the Irish 
government, in its capacity as employer, from taking action to frustrate the objectives 
of the Directive before it came into force.97 None of these protections is likely to 
figure in Article 6 ECHR, and the common law is considerably more feeble in its 
protection of access to courts and effective remedies.98  
 
The heightened level of protection under EU law arises, I suggest, because it 
embodies a dual requirement: both the individual’s right of access to a court and the 
need for Member States to ensure adequate protection of EU rights at the systemic 
level (so contributing to the uniformity of EU standards across Member States).99 The 
twin standards have different sources, though they often chime together, with the 
second element principally based on the duties of a Member State, including its 
courts, to ensure EU law is fully effective.100 But this second element is pretty much 
absent from both the common law and Article 6 ECHR, owing to their focus on the 
individual’s right of access to the courts. In principle, the EU standard should enable 
national courts to take account of a wider range of factors, not restricted to whether 
an actual individual could realistically cross the threshold into the court room, such 
                                                 
93 Case C-279/09, DEB Deutsche Energiehandles [2011] 2 CMLR 21, ECJ and Benkharbouche v 
Embassy of Republic of Sudan [2016] QB 341, CA. 
94 The effective remedy provisions in Article 13 ECHR are restricted to violations of the rights 
in the Convention itself, and in any case have not generated a requirement of compensation for full 
financial loss. 
95 Case C-185/97 [1999] ICR 100 paras 23-27. 
96 Impact, n 74, especially paras 51-55. 
97 Impact, n 74, paras 83-92.  
98 See e.g. the absence of any right to legal aid at all at common law: see R v Lord Chancellor ex 
p. Witham [1998] QB 575. For discussion of the weakness of the common law compared to Article 6, 
see P. Bowen QC, ‘Does the Renaissance of Common Law Rights Mean that the Human Rights Act 
1998 is now Unnecessary?’ [2016] 4 European Human Rights Law Review 361 (and cf. Pham v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2015] 1 WLR 1591 per Lord Reed at paras 118-119). 
99 For discussion of the ‘adequacy’ test, see W. Van Gerven ‘Of Rights, Remedies and 
Procedures’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 501. 
100 See e.g. Impact n 74 at paras 40-43, drawing on, now, Article 288 TFEU and Article 4 TEU.  
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as whether national measures ‘might deter’ individuals in general from bringing 
claims and so interfere with real, effective realisation of legal standards.101 
 
Whatever the limitations of EU law – and UNISON and URTU expose these all to 
clearly - post-Brexit the door is wide open for an expanded use of collateral attacks 
on workers’ rights, with many more potential weapons to draw upon and much 
weaker constraints on action. The Government’s hand on tribunal fees will be 
strengthened, and it will be free to introduce other procedural restrictions, 
exemptions for small businesses, qualifying periods or limitations on remedies pretty 
much as it wishes. In a post-Brexit world no action could have been brought in 
URTU at all. Save where legislation interferes with the individualised notion of 
‘access to justice’ in Article 6, collateral attacks will be largely immune from 
challenge, and in all cases primary legislation would be a trump card.  Whether the 
Prime Minister’s personal ‘guarantee’ to protect existing workers’ rights extends to 
limiting the use of such collateral attacks during her premiership is unclear, but no-
one is taking bets on the pending reviews of Matthew Taylor or the Ministry of 
Justice leading to radical steps to reduce the effect of fees. The long-term future post-
Brexit may increasingly be rights without remedies, a logic which has recently been 
pushed to its end point.102  
 
IV CONCLUSION 
Despite the recent assurance of the Prime Minister, Brexit continues to pose serious 
threats to workers’ rights and the means of giving effect to them. In the short(ish) 
term, the loss of references to the ECJ, coupled with other probable effects such as 
the loss of infringement proceedings, are likely to cause some regression in 
standards. The potential damage to workers’ rights will be significantly increased if 
the interpretative obligation, or something similar, is not retained by means of the 
GRB, opening space for arguments that existing judgments on the interpretation of 
domestic law should be revisited. If direct effect of Treaty Articles and Directives is 
not preserved via the GRB, this loss will be more ambiguous to workers and unions, 
causing some harm to individual rights but improving unions’ capacity to take 
collective action. The long-term is much harder to predict, of course, but at present, 
there are few instruments of new EU social law on the horizon which would 
significantly affect employment law if the UK remained a member of the EU.  
 
The more serious long-term effect, I suspect, will be the loss of the constraints 
imposed by EU law on the means of giving effect to workers’ rights. Governments in 
advanced capitalist democracies are under pressure simultaneously to promote free 
                                                 
101 Coote (n 95) para 24; cf. the CA in UNISON n 32.  
102 The draft Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2010 provide no 
remedy at all for breach: see 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504398/GPG_consulta
tion_v8.pdf> accessed 29 September 2016. 
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markets and to satisfy calls from citizens for social entitlements,103 and labour market 
policy is a paradigmatic site where this central conflict is expressed. One superficial 
means of its resolution is to grant workers entitlements in law while allowing 
regulatory liberalism to triumph in fact. Recent reforms show how this can be 
achieved: either the enforcement of general labour standards is privatised - 
responsibility is given solely to individuals not the state - but then is so encumbered 
with financial and other restrictions that few individuals can in practice  obtain an 
adequate remedy (civil claims in ETs); or enforcement is made the exclusive 
responsibility of state agencies which possess a wide discretion to take action or lack 
the necessary resources to make enforcement effective (health and safety duties). The 
adoption of criminal law enforcement for some of the worst kinds of labour market 
abuse is no more than a token gesture the other way,104 irrelevant to most workers 
most of the time, and itself critically dependent on well-resourced enforcement 
agencies. The drift towards symbolic rights has strengthened in recent years; once 
free from EU law, a future government will be have greater power to maintain, 
multiply and intensify collateral attacks on workers’ rights.  
 
Weber’s immanent critique of formal freedom of contract was based on the extent to 
which unequal distributions of property and economic power in practice facilitated 
an increase in authoritarian coercion of workers within the capitalist enterprise.105 It 
remains valid today, but it has been partially corrected by legislative interventions. 
Collateral attacks on those market-correcting rights highlight a second immanent 
critique: the failure of the legal system in fact to deliver the substantive rights which 
it promises. EU law is not and never was a complete answer to such an intractable 
problem, which depends on many factors far beyond how rights are recognised and 
enforced within the legal system; but, for all its limitations, it is a fuller legal 
expression of those immanent norms than what will replace it.  
                                                 
103 W. Streeck, ‘The Crisis in Context: Democratic Capitalism and Its Contradictions’ in A. 
Schäfer and W. Streeck (eds), Politics in the Age of Austerity (Polity 2013). 
104 See the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and Part 1 of the Immigration Act 2016, with the powers 
of the Director of Labour Market Enforcement and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority. 
105 M.Weber, Economy and Society (University of California Press 1978) 730-1  
